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In order to guarantee the output of a quantum computation, we usually assume that the com-
ponent devices are trusted. However, when the total computation process is large, it is not easy
to guarantee the whole system when we have scaling effects, unexpected noise, or unaccounted cor-
relations between several subsystems. If we do not trust the measurement basis nor the prepared
entangled state, we do need to be worried about such uncertainties. To this end, we proposes a “self-
guaranteed” protocol for verification of quantum computation under the scheme of measurement-
based quantum computation where no prior-trusted devices (measurement basis nor entangled state)
are needed. The approach we present enables the implementation of verifiable quantum computation
using the measurement-based model in the context of a particular instance of delegated quantum
computation where the server prepares the initial computational resource and sends it to the client
who drives the computation by single-qubit measurements. Applying self-testing procedures we are
able to verify the initial resource as well as the operation of the quantum devices, and hence the
computation itself. The overhead of our protocol scales as the size of the initial resource state to
the power of 4 times the natural logarithm of the initial state’s size.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum computation offers a novel way of process-
ing information and promises solution of some classically
intractable problems ranging from factorization of large
numbers [1] to simulation of quantum systems [2]. How-
ever, as quantum information processing technologies im-
prove the performance of quantum devices composed of
ion traps and superconducting qubits [3, 4], a natural
question arises; “How can we guarantee the computation
outcome of a prepared quantum computation machine?”
The solution of this problem is strongly desired in the
context of characterization, verification and validation of
quantum systems (QCVV), which is actively addressed in
recent studies [5, 6]. For problems such as factorization,
this does not present an issue as verification takes the
form of simple multiplication of numbers. However, we
cannot deny a possibility that the constructed quantum
device suffers from unexpected noise or unaccounted cor-
relations between several subsystems resulting from our
insufficient experimental control when implementing the
quantum computer. That is, we need to guarantee (ver-
ify) the outcome without any noise model. This task is
called the verification of quantum computation [7–21].
The concept of verifying a quantum computation is
quite different from quantum error correction. In quan-
tum error correction we start with a noise model that
can adversely affect the computation and devise quantum
codes to counteract this noise provided its strength re-
mains below a certain threshold. In verification of quan-
tum computation we do not make any assumptions about
the noise. The prepared states and measurement devices
may be behaving ideally or they may be affected by noise.
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The goal of verification is to ascertain whether the quan-
tum states and measurement devices behave closely ac-
cording to specifications and how this deviation affects
the output of the computation, without assuming any
noise model. This is crucial from an experimental point
of view as it allows us to test quantum devices and guar-
antee their reliable operation.
For this purpose, the verification of quantum compu-
tation needs to satisfy the following two requirements.
One is detectability which means that if the state or the
measurement device is far from the ideal one, we reject
it with high probability. In this stage, no assumption on
the underlying noise model should be made. The other
is acceptability which means that the ideal state and the
ideal measurement device can pass the test with high
probability. Both requirements are needed to character-
ize performance of test in statistical hypothesis testing
[22, 23].
We need to clarify whether we have already verified
the device or not. To address this issue, a device is
called trusted when we have already verified it. Other-
wise, it is called untrusted. This task may seem daunting
at first, particularly when considered in the context of
quantum circuit model [24]. In this model, the compu-
tation takes form of a sequence of local and multi-local
unitary operations applied to the quantum state result-
ing in a quantum output that is finally measured out to
yield the classical result of the computation. In order to
verify the correctness of the output it would appear that
one needs to keep track of the entire dynamics, effec-
tively classically simulating the quantum computation.
This can of course be achieved only for the smallest of
quantum systems due to the exponential increase in the
dimensionality of the Hilbert space with increasing sys-
tem size. Measurement-based model of quantum com-
putation (MBQC), is equivalent to the quantum circuit
model but uses non-unitary evolution to drive the com-
putation [25–27]. In this model, the computation begins
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2with preparation of an entangled multi-qubit resource
state and proceeds by local projective measurements on
this state that use up the initial entanglement. In order
to implement the desired evolution corresponding to the
unitary from the circuit model, the measurements must
be performed in an adaptive way where future measure-
ment bases depend on previous measurement outcomes
which imposes a temporal ordering on the measurements.
The initial proposal of MBQC in [25] considered a clus-
ter state as the initial state [28] and measurements in the
X-Y plane of the qubit’s Bloch sphere at an arbitrary
angle along with Z measurements. It has been recently
shown that Z measurements are in fact not necessary
[29]. We consider measurements of X, Z and X±Z that
are approximatly universal when paired with a triangu-
lar lattice as the initial resource state [30]. For trusted
measurement devices, the computation outcome can be
guaranteed only by verifying the initial entangled multi-
qubit resource state [31] using stabilizer measurements.
However, for untrusted devices this method alone is not
sufficient.
Our task is guaranteeing the computation outcome
without trusting the measurement devices as well as the
initial entangled resource state. To achieve this, we em-
ploy self-testing techniques to guarantee prepared states
as well as to certify the operation of quantum devices.
Self-testing, originally proposed in [32, 33], is a statistical
test that compares measured correlations with the ideal
ones and based on the closeness of these two cases draws
conclusions whether the real devices behave as instructed
under a particular definition of equivalence. In any run
of the computation we assume that the prepared physi-
cal states and devices are untrusted and therefore need
testing. Self-testing does not make any artificial assump-
tions about the Hilbert space structure of the devices
or the measurement operators corresponding to classical
outcomes observed.
To achieve verification of quantum computation, we
need to establish a self-test for a triangular graph state
as well as measurements mentioned in the above para-
graph. McKague proposed a self-testing procedure for
such a graph state in [34] along with measurements in the
X-Z plane. However, this method requires many copies
of the n-qubit graph state scaling as O(n22) and there-
fore is not possible with current or near-future quantum
technologies.
In this paper, with feasible experimental realization in
mind, we propose a self-testing procedure for a triangu-
lar graph state along with measurements of X, Z and
X ± Z. One of the main differences between MBQC
and the quantum circuit model is the clear split between
preparation of the initial entangled resource state and
the computation itself. This property suggests a natural
approach to guaranteeing the outcome of the computa-
tion by splitting the verification process into two parts.
Firstly, we have to verify the initial entangled multi-qubit
resource state. Secondly, we guarantee the correct oper-
ations of the measurement devices that drive the compu-
tation. To realize this approach, we begin by introducing
a protocol that reduces self-testing for a triangular graph
state to a combination of self-tests for a Bell state.
Original proposals of Mayers and Yao [32, 33] have con-
sidered self-testing of a Bell state. The method of [35] is
based on the Mayers-Yao test while [36] discusses meth-
ods based on the Mayers-Yao test as well as the CHSH
test. These two approaches require relatively small num-
ber of measurement settings. However, direct application
of these methods to our protocol results in a huge num-
ber of required copies of the graph state. To resolve this
issue, we propose a different method for self-testing of a
Bell state, which has better precision as previous meth-
ods.
II. SELF-TESTING OF MEASUREMENTS
BASED ON TWO-QUBIT ENTANGLED STATE
As the first step, we consider a self-testing protocol of
local measurements on the untrusted system H′1 when
the untrusted state |Φ′〉 is prepared on the bipartite sys-
tem H′1 ⊗H′2. The trusted state corresponding to |Φ′〉 is
(|0,+〉 + |1,−〉)/√2. Note that even though the trusted
system is a two-qubit state, we do not assume that ei-
ther of the untrusted systems H′1 or H′2 are C2. In the
rest of our paper we denote untrusted states and op-
erators with primes, such as |ψ′〉 and X ′, in order to
distinguish them from trusted states and devices which
have no primes. Our protocol satisfies the following re-
quirements related to our self-testing protocol for three-
colorable graph state.
(1-1): Identify measurements of X1, Z1 and (X1 ±
Z1)/
√
2 within a constant error .
(1-2): Measure X ′1, Z
′
1, A(0)
′
1 and A(1)
′
1 on the system
H′1, where A(i)′1 := [X ′1 + (−1)iZ ′1]/
√
2.
(1-3): Measure only X ′2 and Z
′
2 on the system H′2.
(1-4): Prepare only O(δ−4) samples for the required pre-
cision level δ, whose definition will be given latter.
Requirement (1-1) is needed for universal computa-
tion based on measurement-based quantum computation
[30]. Three-colorable graph states can be partitioned into
three subsets of non-adjacent qubits. In the rest of our
paper, we refer to one of these subsets as black qubits
(B), the second subset is referred to as white qubits (W)
and the final subset are red qubits (R). To realize the
self-guaranteed MBQC of n-qubit three-colorable graph
state with resource size O(n4 log n), we need the require-
ment (1-4). Indeed, McKague et al. [36] already gave
a self-testing protocol for the Bell state. However, their
protocol requires resource size that scales as O(n8) (Re-
mark 1 of Appendix E).
The self-testing procedure is illustrated in FIG. 1. We
prepare 8m copies of the initial state and split them ran-
domly into 8 groups that are then measured to test the
3FIG. 1. Representation of the self-testing procedure for the
state (|0,+〉+ |1,−〉)/√2. We prepare 8m copies of this state
which are then randomly divided into 8 groups. Each group is
measured as described in (2-3) and (2-4). There are 4 mea-
surement settings for system H′1 and 2 measurement settings
for system H′2. Each group is measured by one device acting
on system H′1 and one device acting on system H′2.
correlations. The procedure is described as follows and
is denoted by Test (2):
(2-1): Prepare 8m states |Φ′〉.
(2-2): Randomly divide 8m blocks into 8 groups, in
which, the 1st - 8th groups are composed of m
blocks.
(2-3): Measure X ′1, Z
′
1, A(0)
′
1, A(0)
′
1, A(1)
′
1, A(1)
′
1, X
′
1,
Z ′1 on the system H′1 for the 1st - 8th groups.
(2-4): The corresponding measurements on H′2 for the 8
groups are Z ′2, X
′
2, Z
′
2, X
′
2, Z
′
2, X
′
2, X
′
2, and Z
′
2.
(2-5): Based on the above measurements, we check the
following 5 inequalities for 8 average values:
Av[X ′1Z
′
2] = 1, Av[Z
′
1X
′
2] = 1, (1)
Av[A(0)′1(Z
′
2 +X
′
2)] ≥
√
2− c1√
m
, (2)
Av[A(1)′1(Z
′
2 −X ′2)] ≥
√
2− c1√
m
, (3)∣∣Av[X ′1X ′2 + Z ′1Z ′2]∣∣ ≤ c1√m. (4)
Here, for example, the average value in (2) is calcu-
lated from the outcomes of the 3rd and 4th groups.
This leads to the following theorem, which is shown in
Appendix E.
Theorem 1. Given a significance level α and an ac-
ceptance probability β, there exists a pair of positive real
numbers c1 and c2 satisfying the following condition. If
the state (|0,+〉 + |1,−〉)/√2 and measurement are pre-
pared with no error, Test (2) of the above c1 is passed
with probability β. Once Test (2) of the above c1 is
passed, we can guarantee, with significance level α, that
there exists an isometry U : H′1 → H1 such that
‖UX ′1U† −X1‖ ≤ δ, ‖UA(0)′1U† −A(0)1‖ ≤ δ, (5)
‖UZ ′1U† − Z1‖ ≤ δ, ‖UA(1)′1U† −A(1)1‖ ≤ δ, (6)
where δ := c2m
−1/4, which is called the required precision
level.
Note that the significance level α is the maximum pass-
ing probability when one of the conditions in (2-5) does
not hold [22]. The acceptance probability β is also called
the power of the test in hypothesis testing and is the
probability to accept the test in the ideal case. To satisfy
the detectability and the acceptability, α and β are cho-
sen to be constants close to 0 and 1, respectively, which
leads to their trade-off relation. In this way, we can show
how the measurements forming an approximately univer-
sal set for MBQC can be certified using a two-qubit state.
Now we proceed to extend this scheme to three-colorable
states of arbitrary size.
III. SELF-TESTING OF A THREE-COLORABLE
GRAPH STATE
Now, we give a self-testing for a three-colorable graph
state |G′〉, composed of the black part (B), the white part
(W), and the red part (R), whose total number of qubits
is n. Our protocol needs to prepare cm samples of the
state |G′〉, where m is O(n4 log n), where the constant c
depends on the structure of the graph G.
To specify it, we introduce three numbers lB , lW , and
lR for a three-colorable graph G. Consider the set SB :=
{1, . . . , nB} of black sites, the set SW := {1, . . . , nW }
of white sites, and the set SR := {1, . . . , nR} of red
sites. We denote the neighborhood of the site i by
Ni ⊂ SW ∪ SR. We divide the sites SB into lB subsets
SB,1, . . . , SB,lB such that Ni ∩ Nj = ∅ for i 6= j ∈ SB,k
for any k = 1, . . . , nB . That is, elements of SB,k have
no common neighbors, which is called the non-conflict
condition. We choose the number lB as the minimum
number satisfying the non-conflict condition. We also
define the numbers lW and lR for the white and red sites
in the same way. In FIG. 2, we show that for a triangular
graph lB , lW , lR ≤ 3. Based on this structure, testing of
measurement devices on each site on SB,k can be reduced
to the two-qubit case as follows,
(3-1): Prepare 8m states |G′〉.
(3-2): Measure Z ′ on all sites of SB \SB,k for all copies.
Then, apply Z ′ operators on the remaining sites to
correct for the Z ′ measurement depending on the
outcomes.
(3-3): For all i ∈ SB,k, choose a site ji ∈ Ni. Then,
measure Z ′ on all sites of SW \ {ji}i∈SB,k for all
copies. Apply Z ′ operators on the remaining sites
to correct for the Z ′ measurements depending on
the outcomes.
4FIG. 2. Two examples of three-colorable graphs with their
black vertices partitioned into subsets {SB,k}lBk=1. For the
small graph in a), we can see that lB ≤ 2. The triangular
lattice in b) is still three-colorable but has lB ≤ 3. It can be
readily checked that this partitioning satisfies the non-conflict
condition since elements of the same partition SB,j do not
share any common neighbors. White and red vertices may be
partitioned in the same way which means that lW , lR ≤ 3.
(3-4): For ideal devices, the resultant state should be
⊗i∈SB,k |Φ′〉iji . Finally, apply the above self-testing
procedure to all of {|Φ′〉iji}i∈SB,k .
Since the above protocol verifies the measurement device
on black sites in SB,k, we call it B-protocol with SB,k. We
define W-protocol with SW,k and R-protocol with SR,k in
the same way.
Choosing c3 to be 3 + 8(lB + lW + lR), we propose the
following self-testing protocol, which is denoted by Test
(4):
(4-1): Prepare c3m+ 1 copies of n-qubit state |G′〉.
(4-2): Randomly divide the c3m + 1 copies into c3 + 1
groups. The first c3 groups are composed of m
copies and the final group is composed of a single
copy.
(4-3): Measure Z ′ on the black and white sites and X ′
on the red sites for the 1st group and check that
the outcome of X ′ measurements is the same as
predicted from the outcomes of Z ′ measurements.
(4-4): Repeat the above stabilizer test on the 2nd group
but measure white and red sites in the Z ′ basis and
black sites in X ′ basis.
(4-5): Repeat the above stabilizer test on the 2nd group
but measure red and black sites in the Z ′ basis and
white sites in X ′ basis.
(4-6): Run the B-protocol with SB,k for the 4+8(k−1)-
th - 3 + 8k-th groups. Repeat this protocol for
k = 1, . . . , lB .
(4-7): Run W-protocol and R-protocol with SW,k and
SR,k for the 4 + 8(lB + k − 1)-th - 2 + 8(lB + k)-th
and the 4+8(lB+lW +k−1)-th - 2+8(lB+lW +k)-
th groups as in Step (4-6), respectively. Repeat
this protocol for k = 1, . . . , lW and k = 1, . . . , lR,
respectively.
Steps (4-3), (4-4), and (4-5) perform the stabilizer test
given in [31] adapted to a triangular graph state which
certifies the graph state |G〉. For our self-testing, we need
to guarantee local measurements of X1, Z1 and (X1 ±
Z1)/
√
2 for all sites. Since Test (4) utilizes B-protocol
which in turn uses Test (2), Test (4) depends on the
parameter c1 of Test (2).
For acceptability, we need to pass Test (2) in all sites,
i.e., n qubits. Hence, as shown in Appendix F, to realize
an acceptance probability β close to 1, we need to choose
c1 to be c4(log n)
1/2 with a certain constant c4, which
leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Given a significance level α and an ac-
ceptance probability β, there exists a pair of positive real
numbers c2 and c4 satisfying the following condition.
If the state |G〉 and our measurements are prepared
with no error, Test (4) with c1 = c4(log n)
1/2 is passed
with probability β. Once Test (4) with c1 = c4(log n)
1/2
is passed, we can guarantee, with significance level α, that
there exists an isometry Ui : H′i → Hi such that∥∥UiX ′iU†i −Xi∥∥, ∥∥UiZ ′iU†i − Zi∥∥ ≤ δ (7)∥∥UiA(0)′iU†i −A(0)i∥∥, ∥∥UiA(1)′iU†i −A(1)i∥∥ ≤ δ (8)
Tr
[
σ(I − P ′1)
]
,Tr
[
σ(I − P ′2)
]
,Tr
[
σ(I − P ′3)] ≤
α
m
(9)
where δ := c2(
logn
m )
1/4, U := U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un, σ is the
resultant state on the final group, and P ′1, P
′
2, P
′
3 are
POVM elements corresponding to pass of Steps (4-3),
(4-4), and (4-5).
Here, the conditions (7)–(8) follow from Theorem 1
and the condition (9) follows from a similar discussion
for the stabilizer test given in [31].
IV. CERTIFICATION OF THE
COMPUTATIONAL RESULT
To guarantee the computational result, we need to
guarantee that our computational operation is very close
to the true operation based on Theorem 2. When {Mi}i
is a POVM realized by an adaptive measurement on each
site from X, Z, A(0), and A(1), as shown in Appendix
G, Theorem 2 guarantees that∥∥UM ′iU† −Mi∥∥ ≤ 8nδ, (10)
where Mi is the ideal POVM. This inequality can be
shown by a modification of a virtual unitary protocol
composed of a collection of unitaries on each site con-
trolled by another trusted system [9, Lemma 3.6]. Thus,
as shown in Appendix H, Eqs. (9) combined with the
relationship between trace distance and fidelity [37] and
the above discussion lead to∥∥UσU† − |G〉〈G|∥∥
1
≤ 6nδ + 3α
m
. (11)
5When M ′j is the POVM element of all the outcomes cor-
responding to the correct computational result, we have∣∣Tr(M ′jσ −Mj |G〉〈G|)∣∣
≤∣∣Tr(UM ′jU† −Mj)UσU†∣∣+ ∣∣TrMj(UσU† − |G〉〈G|)∣∣
≤14nδ + 3α
m
. (12)
Thus, choosing m = O(n4 log n), we can achieve con-
stant upper bound for the probability of accepting an
incorrect output of the quantum computation with sig-
nificance level α. Connection between our protocol and
interactive proof systems [38, 39] is made explicit in Ap-
pendix I.
V. APPLICATION TO MEASUREMENT-ONLY
BLIND QUANTUM COMPUTATION
The above protocol may be applied to the scenario
of measurement-only blind quantum computation [20,
31, 40] when the client does not trust the quantum de-
vices performing the measurements. Measurement-only
blind quantum computation is a type of delegated quan-
tum computation where the client with limited quantum
power instructs a server to prepare a multipartite entan-
gled state which is then sent to the client who performs
single-qubit measurements that drive the computation.
This protocol is blind by construction, meaning the server
cannot find out anything about the computation, and can
be verified by stabiliser testing when the client trusts
the measurement devices [31]. Measurement-only blind
quantum computation was demonstrated experimentally
in an optical setup in [41]. Ability to quickly generate
and measure quantum states is essential in any verifica-
tion protocol therefore we believe that this setup shows
great promise for implementing the self-guaranteed pro-
tocol in the near future.
Now we address the case when the measurement de-
vices are not trusted. We consider the client (Verifier) in-
teracting with two servers, Prover 1 and Prover 2, where
Prover 1 prepares the initial state and Prover 2 is used
to measure the qubits and therefore test the state and
the operation of the quantum devices. There is a possi-
bility that the noise in the initial state is correlated to
the noise in the measurement devices. To overcome this
problem the Verifier asks Prover 1 to apply a random uni-
tary U(T ) :=
(
cos piT8 − sin piT8
sin piT8 cos
piT
8
)
on every qubit, where
T is a uniform random number chosen from {0, 1, · · · , 7}.
This technique of discrete twirling was also used to hide
information about the initial state in the blind quantum
computation protocols of [16–18]. We denote the full vec-
tor containing information about the applied local rota-
tions by
−→
T . We assume that the order of measurements
to be applied does not depend on the measurement out-
comes in the computation. This means that the qubits
can be always measured in the same order regardless of
the computation and only their basis depends on previ-
ous measurement outcomes. The measurement process is
composed of n stages. In the i-th stage of measurement,
Verifier asks Prover 2 to measure the i-th qubit on each
copy, taking into account the random unitary U(T ). This
discrete twirling removes the correlation among the sites
on the color. Therefore, the measurement devices on all
sites and the state can be considered to be independent.
This protocol requires only independence among two
parts, the part of generation of quantum states and the
measurement devices. In the language of interactive
proof systems this would require Prover 1 and Prover 2
to be independent. This requirement is usually enforced
by considering Provers that are permitted to agree on a
prior cheat strategy but are not allowed to communicate
once the protocol commences.
The assumption of independence between the prepara-
tion stage and measurement stage is quite strong. How-
ever it is necessary since Prover 1 could quite easily en-
code the information about the local random unitaries
which Prover 2 could later use to his advantage. This also
highlights that the scenario considered in this verification
scheme is not the usual one of protocols based on interac-
tive proof systems where the Provers are assumed to be
non-communicating. Here Prover 1 and Prover 2 engage
in one-way quantum communication necessitating our as-
sumption that they are to a large degree honest. On the
other hand this assumption is natural in the context of
verifying quantum technologies where the Provers are not
assumed to be malicious and the only deviation from the
verification protocol is caused by unexpected noise. Sim-
ilar less secure approach has been recently fruitfully used
in [42] to efficiently verify adaptive Clifford circuits.
It is possible to enhance our protocol to the case where
the Provers are considered malicious and are actively con-
spiring against the Verifier. Assume that the Provers
share a Bell pair for every qubit that Prover 1 is in-
structed to prepare. The Verifier then asks Prover 1 to
perform a two-qubit Bell measurement on the i-th qubit
of a prepared graph state and its corresponding Bell-pair
qubit, reporting the outcomes to the Verifier. All the
outcomes are denoted by vector T ′. The effect of these
measurements is to teleport the prepared initial states
from Prover 1 to Prover 2 up to a local unitary. The Ver-
ifier then proceeds with self-testing protocol of Test (4)
taking into account the local rotations U(T + T ′). Note
that even if Prover 2 has access to the information about
T he cannot use it to cheat the Verifier as the vector T ′
is also uniformly random and unknown to him. By tele-
porting the copies of initial graph state from Prover 1 to
Prover 2, the Verifier can check the computation without
making any strong assumptions about the independence
of the two Provers. This addition to our protocol intro-
duces only a multiplicative factor and does not affect the
scaling of the overhead required by our protocol.
6VI. DISCUSSION
The above analysis has been restricted to the case of
three-colorable graph states. In fact, the non-conflict
condition can be relaxed to the case of graph states which
are k-colorable as follows. Firstly, we remember that
our analysis can be divided into two parts, testing of the
measurement basis and testing of the graph state. The
first part can be generalized as follows. For each color
i = 1, . . . , k, we divide the set of vertices with color i
into subsets Si,1, . . . , Si,li such that there is no common
neighborhood for each subset Si,j . In this case, we can
generalized the B-protocol as explained in Appendix J.
Then, applying this generalization to all colors in the pro-
tocol, we can extend the first part. To realize the second
part, for each color i, we measure non-i color sites with Z
basis and check whether the outcome of measurement X
on the sites with color i is the same as the predicted one.
We repeat this protocol for all colors. Due to this con-
struction we obtain the same analysis as three-colorable
case when the numbers l1, . . . , lk are bounded.
For a computation on an n-qubit graph state the
resources needed to achieve a constant upper bound
for probability of accepting a wrong outcome scale as
O(n4 log n). This is the same scaling obtained in [8]
which raises an interesting open question of minimal over-
head required to guarantee an outcome of quantum com-
putation. We have shown how our self-testing protocol
can be applied to measurement-only blind quantum com-
putation in the case when also the measurement devices
cannot be fully trusted.
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Appendix A: Significance level
In statistical hypothesis testing, the significance level
is a key concept for a given test T . In general, we say
that the statement S holds with the significance level α
when the probability of making an incorrect decision is
less than α under this claim. More precisely, the proba-
bility of the following event is less than α; we claim the
statement S and the statement S is incorrect.
If the statement S is a property of the true initial state
and measurement device, this can be formulated of a sim-
ple form as follows. We say that the true initial state and
measurement device satisfy the property S with the sig-
nificance level α (or simply the property S holds with
the significance level α) when the test T is passed and
the following condition holds. When the true initial state
and measurement device do not satisfy the property S,
the probability to pass the test T is smaller than α. Usu-
ally, there are many probability distributions of the whole
system even when the true initial state and measurement
device are fixed to not satisfy the property S because we
have several possibilities of the true initial state and mea-
surement device. This formulation is the conventional
formulation in statistical hypothesis testing. However, in
the self-testing, we need to treat the case when the state-
ment S is not a property of the true initial state and
measurement device, which requires a more complicated
formulation.
Assume that a certain property S′ implies that the
statement S is correct with probability γ, which can be
regarded as a kind of property of an initial state and a
measurement device. Now, we assume that the test T is
passed and we claim the statement S as a result. The
case of making an incorrect decision is contained in the
union of the following two cases. One is the case when
the property S′ does not hold. The other is the case
when the statement S is not correct while the property S′
holds. When the property S′ holds with the significance
level α, we can say that the statement S holds with the
significance level α + γ. This is because the probability
of making an incorrect decision is less than the sum of
the probabilities of the above two cases.
Appendix B: Interval estimation with binomial
distribution
We consider how to verify the success probability of a
binary system by using sampling. Assume that n binary
systems X1, . . . , Xn take values in {1, 0}. We randomly
choose m systems and denote the sum by X. We as-
sume that the variables X1, . . . , Xn independently obey
the same distribution P (1) = p and P (1) = 1 − p. We
randomly choose one variable X ′ from n−m remaining
systems. Then, the variable X ′ obeys the binary distri-
bution with average p. Now, we consider how to make
a statement with respect to the average p from the ob-
served value X.
In the following, we denote the binomial distribution
of m trials with probability p by Bp. Given p, we define
x+(p) as min{x|Bp(X ≥ x) ≤ α}, which is often called
the percent point with α. Then, when the observed X
satisfies X ≥ x+(p0), we can say that the parameter
p is larger than p0 with significance level α. When m
is sufficiently large, x+(p0) is approximated to mp0 +√
mΦ−1(α)
√
p0(1− p0). Similarly, we define x−(p) as
max{x|Bp(X ≤ x) ≤ α}. Hence, when the observed
X satisfies x−(p1) ≥ X ≥ x−(p0), we can say that the
parameter p belongs to (p0, p1) with significance level 2α.
For a constant a and a sufficiently large m, the
value
√(
p∗ + a√m
)(
1−
(
p∗ + a√m
))
can be approx-
7imated to
√
p∗(1− p∗). We choose p0 = p∗ −
1√
m
(Φ−1(β) + Φ−1(α))
√
p∗(1− p∗) and p1 = p∗ +
1√
m
(Φ−1(β) + Φ−1(α))
√
p∗(1− p∗). We define our
test T (m, p∗, β) (T−(m, p∗, β)) by the condition that
the observed X belongs to the interval [mp∗ −√
mΦ−1(β)
√
p∗(1− p∗),mp∗ +
√
mΦ−1(β)
√
p∗(1− p∗)]
(the half interval [mp∗ +
√
mΦ−1(β)
√
p∗(1− p∗),+∞)).
We have the following two lemmas.
The following lemma guarantees the success probabil-
ity when the test is passed even when the system is mali-
ciously prepared but the distribution is independent and
identical, which relates to the soundness.
Lemma 1. When the test T (m, p∗, β) (T−(m, p∗, β)) is
passed, we can say that the parameter p belongs to the
interval [p∗ − 1√m (Φ−1(β) + Φ−1(α))
√
p∗(1− p∗), p∗ +
1√
m
(Φ−1(β) + Φ−1(α))
√
p∗(1− p∗)] with significance
level α. (the half interval [p∗ − 1√m (Φ−1(β) +
Φ−1(α))
√
p∗(1− p∗),+∞) with significance level α).
The following lemma guarantees that the test will be
passed with high probability when the system is well pre-
pared to be the independent and identical distribution
with success probability p∗, which relates to the com-
pleteness.
Lemma 2. Further, when the true parameter p is p∗, the
test T (m, p∗, β) (T−(m, p∗, β)) is passed with probability
1− 2β (1− β).
Appendix C: Interval estimation with
hyper-geometric distribution
In general, the variables X1, . . . , Xn are not neces-
sarily independent and identical. Now, we consider
such a general case. Since X is given as the sum of
m random samples, the distribution of X is given as∑n
k=0QK(k)PHG|n,m,k with the distribution QK of the
hidden variable K on {0, 1, . . . , 2m + 1}, where the hy-
pergeometric distribution PHG|n,m,k is given as
PHG|n,m,k(x) :=
(
m
x
)(
n−m
k−x
)(
n
k
) , (C1)
which has been employed in the security analysis on the
quantum key distribution, for example [43–45]. Since
X ′ is a random choice from n − m remaining systems,
when K = k and X = x, the variable X ′ obeys the
distribution PHG|n−m,1,k−x, which equals the binary dis-
tribution with average k−xn−m . In general, when X = x,
the success probability of the binary distribution of X ′ is∑
k PK|X(k, x)
k−x
n−m . Define the positive value c(α, β) as
c(α, β)2 :=
(
1
2 +
n
n−mΦ
−1(β)
√
p∗(1− p∗)
)2
α
. (C2)
Now, we consider how to make a statement with respect
to the success probability of the binary distribution of X ′
from the observed value X. The following lemma guaran-
tees the success probability when the test is passed even
when the system is maliciously and the distribution is not
independent nor identical, which relates to the soundness
in the general case.
Lemma 3. Assume that n = κm + o(m). When the
test T (m, p∗, β) is passed, we can say that the success
probability of the binary distribution of X ′ belongs to the
interval [p∗− c(α,β)√m , p∗+
c(α,β)√
m
] with significance level α.
We fix  > 0 and choose c :=
(
1
2+2Φ
−1(β)
√
p∗(1−p∗)
)2
α .
Due to Lemma 3, to guarantee that the success probabil-
ity of a binary system belongs to the interval [p∗−, p∗+]
with significance level α, we need to prepare 2 c
2
2 samples
and observe c
2
2 samples.
Next, we define the test T (m, 0) by the condition that
the observed X equals 0. We have the following lemma,
Lemma 4. When the test T (m, 0) is passed, we can say
that the success probability of the binary distribution of
X ′ is less than 1−αmα with significance level α.
We fix  > 0. Due to Lemma 4, to guarantee that the
success probability of a binary system is less than  with
significance level α, we need to prepare and observe 1−αα
samples.
Now, we discuss what kind of test will be used in this
paper. In the definition of c(α, β), the term nn−m appears.
If n − m does not increase with the order O(n), this
term goes to infinity. For example, when m is a half
of n, this term is 2, which yields a useful application of
Lemma 3. Hence, when we need to verify that the binary
variable has the success probability close to a certain non-
zero value p∗, we use the test T (m, p∗, β) with a half of
observed values, i.e., m = n/2. In contrast, when we
need to verify that the binary variable has the success
probability close to zero, we use all of observed values
and employ the test T (m, 0).
Appendix D: Proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4
Proof of Lemma 3: Step 1): In this proof, the dis-
tribution QK does not necessarily have a positive prob-
ability at one point. To treat this case, we address the
joint distribution PXK of X and K and the conditional
distribution PK|X . When we observe x as the outcome
of the random variable X, the success probability of the
binary distribution of X ′ is p(x) :=
∑
k PK|X(k|x) k−xn−m .
Using c1 := Φ
−1(β)
√
p∗(1− p∗) We define the function
f(x) :=
{ |p∗ − p(x)| when ∣∣p∗ − xm ∣∣ ≤ c1√m
0 otherwise.
(D1)
8The probability of making an incorrect decision is the
probability of the event that f(X) > c(α, β). Therefore,
it is sufficient to show that this probability is less than
α. As shown later, we have
EXf(X)
2 ≤ 1
m
(
1
2
+
n
n−mc1
)2
. (D2)
Then, Chebyshev inequality guarantees
PX
{
f(X) ≥ c(α, β)√
m
}
≤ α, (D3)
which is equivalent to the desired statement.
Step 2): In the following, we show (D2). First, we
notice that
EXf(X)
2 = E˜X |p∗ − p(X)|2
= E˜X
(
EK|X
(
p∗ − K −X
n−m
))2
≤ E˜X
(
EK|X
(
p∗ − K −X
n−m
)2)
= EK
(
E˜X|K
(
p∗ − K −X
n−m
)2)
, (D4)
where E˜XY expresses the expectation of
1[p∗− c1√m ,p∗+
c1√
m
](X)Y with respect to X and
1[p∗− c1√m ,p∗+
c1√
m
] is the indicator function on the set
[p∗ − c1√m , p∗ + c1√m ].
For a given k, we set c2 as
∣∣ k
n − p∗
∣∣ = c2√
m
. When∣∣p∗ − Xm ∣∣ ≤ c1√m , we have
c2 − c1√
m
≤
∣∣∣∣Xm − kn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c2 + c1√m . (D5)
Then, we have∣∣∣∣p∗ − k −Xn−m
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣p∗ − kn
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣kn − k −Xn−m
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣p∗ − kn
∣∣∣∣+ mn−m
∣∣∣∣Xm − kn
∣∣∣∣
≤ c2√
m
+
m
n−m
c1√
m
=
1√
m
(
c2 +
m
n−mc1
)
. (D6)
When c2 > c1, using (D5), Chebyshev inequality guar-
antees
PX|K=k
{∣∣∣∣p∗ − Xm
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c1√m
}
≤ PX|K=k
{
c2 − c1√
m
≤
∣∣∣∣Xm − kn
∣∣∣∣}
≤ Vk
m2
(
c2−c1√
m
)2
≤ 1
4(c2 − c1)2 , (D7)
where Vk is the variance of X and is calculated to be
(n−m)m(n−k)k
(n−1)n2 ≤ m4 .
The combination of (D6) and (D7) yields
E˜X|K=k
(
p∗ − k −X
n−m
)2
≤ min
(
1
4(c2 − c1)2 , 1
)
1
m
(
c2 +
m
n−mc1
)2
. (D8)
Since
max
c2:c2≥c1
min
(
1
4(c2 − c1)2 , 1
)
1
m
(
c2 +
m
n−mc1
)2
=
1
m
(
1
2
+
n
n−mc1
)2
, (D9)
we have
E˜X|K=k
(
p∗ − k −X
n−m
)2
≤ 1
m
(
1
2
+
n
n−mc1
)2
.
(D10)
When c2 ≤ c1, we have∣∣∣∣p∗ − k −Xn−m
∣∣∣∣2 ≤ 1m
(
c2 +
m
n−mc1
)2
≤ 1
m
(
1
2
+
n
n−mc1
)2
, (D11)
which implies (D10). The combination of (D4) and (D10)
implies (D2).
Proof of Lemma 4: Step 1): We consider the case
n = m + 1. While the true distribution is given as a
probabilistic mixture of hypergeometric distributions, it
is sufficient to consider the mixture of the cases of K =
0, 1 because there is no possibility to pass the test when
K > 1. Assume that QK(1) = p and QK(0) = 1−p. The
probability to pass is 11+m for K = 1 and 1 for K = 0.
Hence, in general, the probability to pass is 1− p+ p1+m .
When the test T (m, 0) is passed, the success probabil-
ity of the binary distribution of X ′ is
p
1+m
1−p+ p1+m . There-
fore, when the probability to pass is greater than α, i.e.,
p ≤ (1+m)(1−α)m the success probability of the binary dis-
tribution of X ′ is less than
1
1+m
(1+m)(1−α)
m
α =
1−α
mα .
Step 2): We consider the general case. i.e., n > m+ 1.
Even in this case, if we focus on the observed variables
X1, . . . , Xm and the variable X
′, the behavior of X can
be written by a mixture of hypergeometric distributions
with n = m+1. Hence, we obtain the desired statement.
9Appendix E: Bell state and Proof of Theorem 1
1. Proof of Theorem 1 using a proposition
In this appendix, we show Theorem 1 of the main body.
For this purpose, we focus on the observables
X := |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|, Z := |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|. (E1)
We consider the state (|0,+〉 + |1,−〉)/√2 on the com-
posite system H1 ⊗H2. We also define
A(0) :=
X + Z√
2
, A(1) :=
X − Z√
2
. (E2)
Here, instead of the ideal systems H1 and H2, we have
the real systems H′1 and H′2. Also, we assume that we
can measure real observables X ′1, X
′
2, Z
′
1, Z
′
2, A(0)
′
1, and
A(1)′1. Here, we choose the real systems H′1 and H′2 suffi-
ciently large so that our measurements are the projective
decompositions of these observables.
In the following, we prepare the real state |ψ′〉 on the
composite system H′1⊗H′2. Then, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. When
〈ψ′|A(0)′1 (X ′2 + Z ′2)−A(1)′1 (X ′2 − Z ′2) |ψ′〉 ≥ 2
√
2− 1
(E3)
〈ψ′|X ′1Z ′2|ψ′〉 ≥ 1− 2 (E4)
〈ψ′|Z ′1X ′2|ψ′〉 ≥ 1− 3 (E5)
〈ψ′|A(0)′1(Z ′2 +X ′2)|ψ′〉 ≥
√
2− 4, (E6)
〈ψ′|A(1)′1(Z ′2 −X ′2)|ψ′〉 ≥
√
2− 4, (E7)
|〈ψ′|X ′1X ′2 +X ′1Z ′2|ψ′〉| ≤ 5, (E8)
there exists a local isometry U : H′1 → H1 such that∥∥UX ′1U† −X1∥∥ ≤ δ1 (E9)∥∥UZ ′1U† − Z1∥∥ ≤ δ1 (E10)∥∥∥∥UA(0)′1U† − X1 + Z1√2
∥∥∥∥ ≤ δ2 (E11)∥∥∥∥UA(1)′1U† − X1 − Z1√2
∥∥∥∥ ≤ δ2, (E12)
where δ1 :=
∑3
j=1 cˆj
1
2
j and δ2 :=
∑5
j=1 c¯j
1
2
j +
√
2(
1
4
2 +

1
4
3 ), and cˆj and c¯j are constants.
This proposition will be shown in the next subsection.
Also, we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Given an acceptance probability β and a sig-
nificance level α, there exist positive numbers c′ > 0
and c′′ > c1 > 0 satisfying the following. If the state
(|0,+〉 + |1,−〉)/√2 and measurement are prepared with
no error, Test (2) of the above c1 is passed with proba-
bility β (the acceptability). Once all of the conditions in
Step (2-5) with the above c1 are satisfied, with the signif-
icance level α, we can guarantee the conditions (E3)-(E8)
with 2, 3 =
c′
m and 1 =
2c′′√
m
, 4, 5 =
c′′√
m
.
Proof of Theorem 1: We choose three positive num-
bers c′ > 0 and c′′ > c1 > 0 as in Lemma 5. So, Lemma
5 guarantees the acceptability. Once all of the condi-
tions in Step (2-5) with the above c1 are satisfied, with
the significance level α, we can guarantee the conditions
(E3)-(E8) with 2, 3 =
c′
m and 1 =
2c′′√
m
, 4, 5 =
c′′√
m
.
Due to Proposition 1, using a suitable isometry U , with
the significance level α, we can guarantee the conditions
(E9)-(E12) with δ1, δ2 = O((
1
m )
1
4 ), which yields the con-
ditions (5) and (6).
Therefore, due to Proposition 1, using a suitable isom-
etry U , with the significance level α, we can guarantee
the conditions (E9)-(E12) with δ1, δ2 = O(m
− 14 ), which
is the desired argument.
Proof of Lemma 5: The observables in the LHS of
(E4)-(E5) take a deterministic value in the ideal state.
So, the acceptability for Eq. (1) is automatically satis-
fied. There exists a real number c′ satisfying the follow-
ing condition. To accept the tests Av[X ′1Z
′
2] = 1 and
Av[Z ′1X
′
2] = 1 with more than probability α, the condi-
tions (E4)-(E5) of 2, 3 =
c′
m need to hold. Once these
texts Av[X ′1Z
′
2] = 1 and Av[Z
′
1X
′
2] = 1 are passed, we
can guarantee the conditions (E4)-(E5) of 2, 3 =
c′
m
with significance level α.
On the other hand, the observables in the LHS of the
remaining cases (E3), (E4)–(E8) behave probabilistically
even in the ideal state. In order that the ideal state
pass the tests (2), (3), and (4) with probability β, the
coefficient c1 needs to be a constant dependent of β.
Then, dependently of c1 and α, there exists a real num-
ber c′′ > c1 satisfying the following condition. To accept
the tests (1)-(4) with more than probability α, the con-
ditions (E6)-(E8) of 4, 5 =
c′′√
m
need to hold. Once the
tests (1)-(4) are passed, we can guarantee the conditions
(E6)-(E8) of 4, 5 =
c′′√
m
with significance level α. So,
by choosing 1 = 24, (E3) automatically holds.
Remark 1. Here we compare our overhead scaling with
that in [36]. Their evaluation can be summarized as fol-
lows. Let  be the statistical error of observed variables
like the quantities given in (E3) -(E8). [36] focuses on
the matrix norm of the difference between the ideal ob-
servables and the real observables like the quantities ap-
pearing in (E9) -(E12) and shows that these quantities
are upper bounded by O(
1
4 ). However, [36] does not dis-
cuss the relation between the error  and the number of
samples m. Since their statistical errors are in the prob-
abilistic case, the error  is given as O(1/
√
m). Hence,
the above matrix norm is bounded by O(m−1/8).
2. Proof of Proposition 1
To show Proposition 1, we need several lemmas.
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Lemma 6. When
〈ψ′|A(0)′1 (X ′2 + Z ′2)−A(1)′1 (X ′2 − Z ′2) |ψ′〉 ≥ 2
√
2− 1
(E13)
we have
‖(X ′2Z ′2 + Z ′2X ′2)|ψ′〉‖ ≤ 2′1, (E14)
where ′1 := 2
5
4 
1
2
1 .
Lemma 6 follows from Theorem 2 of [36].
Lemma 7. When
〈ψ′|X ′1Z ′2|ψ′〉 ≥ 1− 2 (E15)
〈ψ′|Z ′1X ′2|ψ′〉 ≥ 1− 3, (E16)
we have
‖(X ′1 − Z ′2)|ψ′〉‖ ≤ ′2 (E17)
‖(Z ′1 −X ′2)|ψ′〉‖ ≤ ′3, (E18)
where ′j := 2
1
2 
1
2
j for j = 2, 3.
Proof: Now, we make the spectral decomposition of
X ′1Z
′
2 as X
′
1Z
′
2 = P − (I − P ), where P is a projection.
(E15) implies that 〈ψ′|(I−P )|ψ′〉 ≤ 22 . Schwarz inequal-
ity yields that
1
2
‖(X ′1 − Z ′2)|ψ′〉‖ =
1
2
‖(I −X ′1Z ′2)|ψ′〉‖
= ‖(I − P )|ψ′〉‖
≤
√
2
2
. (E19)
Similarly, we obtain other inequalities.
Lemma 8. When
〈ψ′|X ′1Z ′2|ψ′〉 ≥ 1− 2 (E20)
〈ψ′|Z ′1X ′2|ψ′〉 ≥ 1− 3, (E21)
〈ψ′|A(0)′1(Z ′2 +X ′2)|ψ′〉 ≥ 2− 4, (E22)
〈ψ′|A(1)′1(Z ′2 −X ′2)|ψ′〉 ≥ 2− 4, (E23)
|〈ψ′|X ′1X ′2 + Z ′1Z ′2|ψ′〉| ≤ 5, (E24)
we have ∥∥∥∥(A(0)′1 − Z ′2 +X ′2√2
)
|ψ′〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ′4 (E25)∥∥∥∥(A(1)′1 − Z ′2 −X ′2√2
)
|ψ′〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ′4, (E26)
where ′4 :=
√√
24 +
1
25 +
√
2 +
√
3.
Proof: Since
‖(X ′1Z ′2 − I)|ψ′〉‖ ≤ 2
√
2, (E27)
‖(Z ′1X ′2 − I)|ψ′〉‖ ≤ 2
√
3, (E28)
we have
|〈ψ′|Z ′2X ′2 +X ′2Z ′2|ψ′〉 − 〈ψ′|Z ′2Z ′1 +X ′2X ′1|ψ′〉|
≤‖〈ψ′|Z ′2X ′2‖‖(I − Z ′1X ′2)|ψ′〉‖
+‖〈ψ′|X ′2Z ′2‖‖(I −X ′1Z ′2)|ψ′〉‖
≤2√2 + 2√3. (E29)
So, we obtain (E25) as follows.
∥∥∥∥(A(0)′1 − Z ′2 +X ′2√2
)
|ψ′〉
∥∥∥∥2
=〈ψ′|A(0)′12 −
√
2A(0)′1(Z
′
2 +X
′
2)
+
Z ′2
2
+X ′2
2
+ Z ′2X
′
2 +X
′
2Z
′
2
2
|ψ′〉
=2− 〈ψ′|
√
2A(0)′1(Z
′
2 +X
′
2) +
Z ′2X
′
2 +X
′
2Z
′
2
2
|ψ′〉
≤2−
√
2〈ψ′|A(0)′1(Z ′2 +X ′2)|ψ′〉
+
1
2
〈ψ′|Z ′2Z ′1 +X ′2X ′1|ψ′〉+
√
2 +
√
3
≤2− 2 +
√
24 +
1
2
5 +
√
2 +
√
3
=
√
24 +
1
2
5 +
√
2 +
√
3. (E30)
Similarly, we have
∥∥∥∥(A(1)′1 − Z ′2 +X ′2√2
)
|ψ′〉
∥∥∥∥2
≤2−
√
2〈ψ′|A(1)′1(Z ′2 −X ′2)|ψ′〉
−1
2
〈ψ′|Z ′2Z ′1 +X ′2X ′1|ψ′〉+
√
2 +
√
3
≤
√
24 +
1
2
5 +
√
2 +
√
3, (E31)
which shows (E26).
Lemma 9. When
‖(X ′2Z ′2 + Z ′2X ′2)|ψ′〉‖ ≤ 2′1, (E32)
‖(X ′1 − Z ′2)|ψ′〉‖ ≤ ′2, (E33)
‖(Z ′1 −X ′2)|ψ′〉‖ ≤ ′3, (E34)∥∥∥∥(A(0)′1 − Z ′2 +X ′2√2
)
|ψ′〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ′4, (E35)∥∥∥∥(A(1)′1 − Z ′2 −X ′2√2
)
|ψ′〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ′4, (E36)
there exist local isometries Uj : H′j → Hj for j = 1, 2
11
such that
‖U |ψ′〉 − |junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E37)
‖UX ′1|ψ′〉 −X1|junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E38)
‖UZ ′1|ψ′〉 − Z1|junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E39)
‖UX ′2|ψ′〉 −X2|junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E40)
‖UZ ′2|ψ′〉 − Z2|junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E41)∥∥∥∥UA(0)′1|ψ′〉 − X1 + Z1√2 |junk〉|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ δ′2, (E42)∥∥∥∥UA(1)′1|ψ′〉 − X1 − Z1√2 |junk〉|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ δ′2, (E43)
where δ′1 :=
∑3
j=1 c
′
j
′
j and δ
′
2 :=
√
2δ′1 + 
′
4 and U :=
U2U1.
Proof: We set the initial state on H1⊗H2 to be |0,+〉.
Define U1 := (|0〉〈0| + X ′1|1〉〈1|)H1(|0〉〈0| + Z ′1|1〉〈1|)H1
and U2 := (|0〉〈0| + Z ′2|1〉〈1|)H2(|0〉〈0| + X ′2|1〉〈1|)H2,
where H := |+〉〈0|+ |−〉〈1| = |0〉〈+|+ |1〉〈−|.
Hence, we have
U |ψ′〉 = 1
4
((I + Z ′1)(I +X
′
2)|ψ′〉|0+〉
+ Z ′2(I + Z
′
1)(I −X ′2)|ψ′〉|0−〉
+X ′1(I − Z ′1)(I +X ′2)|ψ′〉|1+〉
+ X ′1Z
′
2(I − Z ′1)(I −X ′2)|ψ′〉|1−〉) . (E44)
When |junk〉 :=
√
2
4 (I + Z
′
1)(I +X
′
2)|ψ′〉, we have
U |ψ′〉 − |junk〉|ψ〉
=
1
4
(Z ′2(I + Z
′
1)(I −X ′2)|ψ′〉|0−〉
+X ′1(I − Z ′1)(I +X ′2)|ψ′〉|1+〉
+(X ′1Z
′
2(I − Z ′1)(I −X ′2)|ψ′〉
−(I + Z ′1)(I +X ′2)|ψ′〉)|1−〉). (E45)
We have
‖Z ′2(I + Z ′1)(I −X ′2)|ψ′〉|0−〉‖
=‖Z ′2(I + Z ′1)(I − Z ′1)|ψ′〉|0−〉‖
+‖Z ′2(I + Z ′1)(Z ′1 −X ′2)|ψ′〉|0−〉‖
≤2′3, (E46)
‖X ′1(I − Z ′1)(I +X ′2)|ψ′〉|1+〉‖
≤‖X ′1(I − Z ′1)(X ′2 − Z ′1)|ψ′〉|1+〉‖
≤2′3. (E47)
Since
X ′1Z
′
2(I − Z ′1)(I −X ′2)|ψ′〉
=Z ′2(I −X ′2)X ′1(I − Z ′1)|ψ′〉
=Z ′2(I −X ′2)X ′1(I −X ′2)|ψ′〉
+Z ′2(I −X ′2)X ′1(X ′2 − Z ′1)|ψ′〉
=Z ′2(I −X ′2)(I −X ′2)Z ′2|ψ′〉
+Z ′2(I −X ′2)(I −X ′2)(Z ′2 −X ′1)|ψ′〉
+Z ′2(I −X ′2)X ′1(X ′2 − Z ′1)|ψ′〉
=2Z ′2(I −X ′2)Z ′2|ψ′〉+ 2Z ′2(I −X ′2)(Z ′2 −X ′1)|ψ′〉
+Z ′2(I −X ′2)X ′1(X ′2 − Z ′1)|ψ′〉
=2Z ′2Z
′
2(I +X
′
2)|ψ′〉 − 2Z ′2(Z ′2X ′2 +X ′2Z ′2)|ψ′〉
+2Z ′2(I −X ′2)(Z ′2 −X ′1)|ψ′〉
+Z ′2(I −X ′2)X ′1(X ′2 − Z ′1)|ψ′〉
=(I +X ′2)
2|ψ′〉 − 2Z ′2(Z ′2X ′2 +X ′2Z ′2)|ψ′〉
+2Z ′2(I −X ′2)(Z ′2 −X ′1)|ψ′〉
+Z ′2(I −X ′2)X ′1(X ′2 − Z ′1)|ψ′〉
=(I +X ′2)(I + Z
′
1)|ψ′〉) + (I +X ′2)(X ′2 − Z ′1)|ψ′〉
−2Z ′2(Z ′2X ′2 +X ′2Z ′2)|ψ′〉
+2Z ′2(I −X ′2)(Z ′2 −X ′1)|ψ′〉
+Z ′2(I −X ′2)X ′1(X ′2 − Z ′1)|ψ′〉, (E48)
we have
‖(X ′1Z ′2(I − Z ′1)(I −X ′2)|ψ′〉 − (I + Z ′1)(I +X ′2)|ψ′〉)‖
≤(2 + 2)′3 + 2′1 + 4′2. (E49)
Thus,
‖U |ψ′〉 − |junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ 1
4
(2′3 + 2
′
3 + 4
′
3 + 2
′
1 + 4
′
2)
=
1
2
(4′3 + 
′
1 + 2
′
2). (E50)
So, we obtain (E37). Inequalities (E38)-(E41) can be
shown by using the anti-commutation relation and ex-
changing X1, Z1, Z1 and X2, X2, Z2. The coefficients cj
for δ are given by counting the number of these opera-
tions.
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Now, we show (E42). We have∥∥∥∥UA(0)′1|ψ′〉 − X1 + Z1√2 |junk〉|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥UA(0)′1|ψ′〉 − Z2 +X2√2 |junk〉|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥UA(0)′1|ψ′〉 − U Z ′2 +X ′2√2 |ψ′〉
∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥U Z ′2 +X ′2√2 |ψ′〉 − Z2 +X2√2 |junk〉|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥(A(0)′1 − Z ′2 +X ′2√2
)
|ψ′〉
∥∥∥∥
+
1√
2
∥∥∥∥U Z ′2√2 |ψ′〉 − Z2√2 |junk〉|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
+
1√
2
∥∥∥∥U X ′2√2 |ψ′〉 − X2√2 |junk〉|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
≤′4 +
√
2δ′1. (E51)
So, we obtain (E42). In the same way, we can show (E43).
Lemma 10. The local isometries Uj : H′j → Hj for
j = 1, 2 satisfy
‖U |ψ′〉 − |junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E52)
‖UX ′1|ψ′〉 −X1|junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E53)
‖UZ ′1|ψ′〉 − Z1|junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E54)
‖UX ′2|ψ′〉 −X2|junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E55)
‖UZ ′2|ψ′〉 − Z2|junk〉|ψ〉‖ ≤ δ′1, (E56)∥∥∥∥UA(0)′1|ψ′〉 − X1 + Z1√2 |junk〉|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ δ′2, (E57)∥∥∥∥UA(1)′1|ψ′〉 − X1 − Z1√2 |junk〉|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥ ≤ δ′2, (E58)
for U := U2U1, we have
‖U1X ′1U†1 −X1‖ ≤ 2
√
2δ′1 (E59)
‖U1Z ′1U†1 − Z1‖ ≤ 2
√
2δ′1 (E60)∥∥∥∥U1A(0)′1U†1 − X1 + Z1√2
∥∥∥∥ ≤ √2(δ′1 + δ′2), (E61)∥∥∥∥U1A(1)′1U†1 − X1 − Z1√2
∥∥∥∥ ≤ √2(δ′1 + δ′2). (E62)
Proof: We have
U1X
′
1U
†
1 |ψ〉|junk〉
=U2U1X
′
1U
†
1U
†
2 |junk〉|ψ〉
=U2U1X
′
1U
†
1U
†
2U2U1|ψ′〉
+U2U1X
′
1U
†
1U
†
2 (|junk〉|ψ〉 − U2U1|ψ′〉)
=U2U1X
′
1|ψ′〉+ U2U1X ′1U†1U†2 (|junk〉|ψ〉 − U2U1|ψ′〉)
=X1|ψ〉|junk〉+ (U2U1X ′1|ψ′〉 −X1|junk〉|ψ〉)
+U2U1X
′
1U
†
1U
†
2 (|junk〉|ψ〉 − U2U1|ψ′〉). (E63)
Hence, we obtain
‖U1X ′1U†1 |ψ〉 −X1|ψ〉‖ ≤ 2δ′1, (E64)
which implies that
‖U1X ′1U†1 −X1‖ ≤ 2
√
2δ′1. (E65)
So, we obtain (E59). Similarly, we obtain other inequal-
ities.
Proof of Proposition 1: Choose δ1 = 2
√
2δ′1 and
δ2 =
√
2(δ′1+δ
′
2) =
√
2((1+
√
2)δ′1+
′
4). Then, combining
these lemmas, we obtain Proposition 1.
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 2
To show Theorem 2 of the main body, we prepare
Lemma 11 as follows.
Lemma 11. Given an acceptance probability β and a
significance level α, there exist positive numbers c′′′ >
c4 > 0 satisfying the following. Here, we use the same
c′ as the proof of Theorem 1. If the state |G〉 and our
measurements are prepared with no error, Test (4) with
c1 = c4(log n)
1/2 is passed with probability β (the accept-
ability). Once all of the conditions in Step (2-5) with
c1 = c4(log n)
1/2 are satisfied in all sites, with the signif-
icance level α, we can guarantee the conditions (E3)-(E8)
in all sites with 2, 3 =
c′
m and 1 =
2c′′′(logn)1/2√
m
, 4, 5 =
c′′′(logn)1/2√
m
.
We choose three positive numbers c′ > 0 and c′′′ >
c4 > 0 as in Lemma 11. So, Lemma 11 guarantees
the acceptability. Once all of the conditions in Step (2-
5) with c1 = c4(log n)
1/2 are satisfied in all sites, with
the significance level α, we can guarantee the conditions
(E3)-(E8) with 2, 3 =
c′
m and 1 =
2c′′′(logn)1/2√
m
, 4, 5 =
c′′′(logn)1/2√
m
. Due to Proposition 1, using a suitable isome-
try U , with the significance level α, we can guarantee the
conditions (E9)-(E12) with δ1, δ2 = O((
logn
m )
1
4 ), which
yields the conditions (7) and (8).
Eqs. (9) can be shown as follows. When Tr σ(I−P ′i ) ≥
α
m , we accept the stabilizer test with respect to Pi with
probability smaller than α. So, we can guarantee that
Trσ(I − P ′i ) ≤ αm with significance level α.
Proof of Lemma 11: To accept the tests Av[X ′1Z
′
2] =
1 and Av[Z ′1X
′
2] = 1 in all sites with more than proba-
bility α, the conditions (E4)-(E5) of 2, 3 =
c′
m need
to hold in all sites. More precisely, the summand of 2
and 3 with respect to all sites need to be
c′
m , which is a
stronger condition than the above condition. Once these
tests Av[X ′1Z
′
2] = 1 and Av[Z
′
1X
′
2] = 1 are passed in
all sites, we can guarantee the conditions (E4)-(E5) of
2, 3 =
c′
m in all sites with significance level α.
13
The observables in the LHS of (E4)-(E5) and the sta-
bilizer test take a deterministic value in the ideal state,
On the other hand, the observables in the LHS of the
remaining cases (E3), (E6)–(E8) behave probabilistically
even in the ideal state. Hence, for the acceptability, we
need to care about the accepting probability only for
(E6)–(E8) in all sites because (E3) follows from (E6) and
(E7). In order that the ideal state accepts all of the tests
(1)-(4) in all sites, i.e., totally 3n tests, with probabil-
ity β, the coefficient c1 needs to increase with respect to
n. For example, when we choose c1 to be c4(log n)
1/2
with a certain constant c4, the ideal state accepts these
tests with probability β in all sites due to the following
reason. To satisfy the above condition, we consider the
case when the ideal state accepts each test of each site
with probability 1 − 1−β4n , which implies that the ideal
state accepts all of 4n tests with more than probabil-
ity β because the test |Av[X ′1X ′2 + Z ′1Z ′2]| ≤ c1√m is re-
garded as two tests. For example, we focus on the test
Av[A(0)′1(Z
′
2 + X
′
2)] ≥
√
2 − c1√
m
. Due to the central
limit theorem, the accepting probability with the ideal
state is approximated to
∫ c1√
v
∞
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 dx, where v is the
variance of A(0)′1(Z
′
2 + X
′
2). By solving the condition∫∞
c1√
v
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 dx = 1−β4n , we obtain c1 = c4(log n)
1/2 with
a certain constant c4. The remaining tests can be treated
in the same way. So, we can conclude that the above
choice of c1 guarantees the condition for the acceptance
probability β.
Then, dependently of c4 and α, there exists a real num-
ber c′′′ > c4 satisfying the following condition. To ac-
cept the tests Av[A(0)′1(Z
′
2 + X
′
2)] ≥
√
2 − c4(logn)1/2√
m
,
Av[A(1)′1(Z
′
2−X ′2)] ≥
√
2− c4(logn)1/2√
m
, and |Av[X ′1X ′2 +
Z ′1Z
′
2]| ≤ c4(logn)
1/2
√
m
, Av[X ′1Z
′
2] = 1, and Av[Z
′
1X
′
2] = 1
in all sites with more than probability α(< β), we
need to accept the tests Av[A(0)′1(Z
′
2 + X
′
2)] ≥
√
2 −
c4(logn)
1/2
√
m
, Av[A(1)′1(Z
′
2 − X ′2)] ≥
√
2 − c4(logn)1/2√
m
, and
|Av[X ′1X ′2 + Z ′1Z ′2]| ≤ c4(logn)
1/2
√
m
Av[X ′1Z
′
2] = 1 and
Av[Z ′1X
′
2] = 1 in each sites with more than probabil-
ity α(< β), which implies that the conditions (E6)-(E8)
of 4, 5 =
c4(logn)
1/2+c′1√
m
hold in each site with a cer-
tain constant c′1. Since
c′′′(logn)1/2√
m
>
c4(logn)
1/2+c′1√
m
,
the above condition implies the conditions (E6)-(E8) of
4, 5 = c
′′′( lognm )
1/2.
Once these texts Av[A(0)′1(Z
′
2 + X
′
2)] ≥
√
2 −
c4(
logn
m )
1/2, Av[A(1)′1(Z
′
2−X ′2)] ≥
√
2−c4( lognm )1/2, and
|Av[X ′1X ′2 + Z ′1Z ′2]| ≤ c4( lognm )1/2 are passed in all sites,
we can guarantee the conditions the conditions (E6)-(E8)
of 4, 5 = c
′′′( lognm )
1/2 in all sites with significance level
α. So, by choosing 1 = 24, (E3) automatically holds in
all sites.
Appendix G: Error of POVM element: Proof of
Inequality (10)
Similarly to [9], we introduce n ideal trusted sys-
tems spanned by |0〉, |1〉 while each untrusted system is
spanned by |1〉, |−1〉. Let Uj be a unitary on the trusted
system. Let Vj be a unitary controlling the j-th un-
trusted system by the trusted system, defined as follows.
The operators on the untrusted system are restricted to
I and s operators {D(i)}si=1 such that their eigenvalues
are 1 or −1 and ‖UD(i)U† − D(i)‖ ≤ δ. In the main
text, s = 4 and {D(i)}i = {X,Z,A(0), A(1)}. Then,
we assume Vj has the form
∑
k∈Fn2 |k〉〈k|Dj(k), where
Dj(k) is one of I and {D(i)}i. According to FIG. 7 of
[9], we define Wj := UjVjWj−1, and W0 = U0 and U :=
U1 · · ·Un.
Proposition 2 ([9, Lemma 6] with modification). We
have
‖UW ′jU† −Wj‖ ≤ sjδ. (G1)
Proof: We have
UW ′jU
† −Wj = UU ′jU†VjUW ′j−1U† − UjVjWj−1
= (UU ′jU
† − Uj)VjUW ′j−1U†
+ UjVj(UW
′
j−1U
† −Wj−1). (G2)
By induction, it is enough to show
‖UU ′jU† − Uj‖ ≤ sδ. (G3)
We have
UU ′jU
† − Uj = U
∑
k∈Fn2
|k〉〈k|Dj(k)′U†
−
∑
k∈Fn2
|k〉〈k|Dj(k)
=
s∑
i=1
∑
k∈Fn2 :
Dj(k)=D(i)
|k〉〈k|(UD′(i)U† −D(i))
(G4)
For i, we have∥∥∥ ∑
k∈Fn2 :
Dj(k)=D(i)
|k〉〈k|(UD′(i)U† −D(i))
∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥ ∑
k∈Fn2 :
Dj(k)=D(i)
|k〉〈k|
∥∥∥ · ∥∥∥UD′(i)U† −D(i)∥∥∥ ≤ δ. (G5)
So, we have (G3).
Assume that our adaptive measurement is given
as follows. Once we obtain the measured outcomes
k1, . . . , kj−1, we measure Dj(k1, . . . , kj−1) on the j-th
system. To discuss such an adaptive measurement, we
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set the initial state |+〉⊗n on the trusted system. Choose
Uj as the application of the Hadamard operator H on
the j-th trusted system. Then, we define
Vj :=
∑
k1,...,kj−1
|k1, . . . , kj−1, 0〉〈k1, . . . , kj−1, 0|
+Dj(k1, . . . , kj−1)|k1, . . . , kj−1, 1〉〈k1, . . . , kj−1, 1|.
Then, we define the TP-CP map Λ from the untrusted
n-qubit system to the trusted n-qubit system as
Λ(ρ) := Tr UTWnρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗nW †n, (G6)
where Tr UT expresses the partial trace with respect to
the untrusted system. Due to the construction, Λ(ρ) is
the same as the output distribution when the above adap-
tive measurement is applied.
Proposition 3 ([9, Corollary 2] with modification). For
any state ρ, we have
‖UΛ′(U†ρU)U† − Λ(ρ)‖1 ≤ 2snδ. (G7)
Hence, when Mi is a POVM element of an adaptive
measurement, we have
‖UM ′iU† −Mi‖ ≤ max
ρ
Tr (UM ′iU
† −Mi)ρ ≤ 2snδ,
(G8)
which implies inequality (10) of the main text by substi-
tuting 4 for s.
Proof: We have
UW ′jU
†(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)UW ′j†U† −Wj(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)W †j
=(UW ′jU
† −Wj)(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)UW ′j†U†
+Wj(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)(UW ′j†U† −W †j ). (G9)
Also, we have
‖(UW ′jU† −Wj)(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)UW ′j†U†‖1
≤‖(UW ′jU† −Wj)‖‖(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)UW ′j†U†‖1
=‖(UW ′jU† −Wj)‖ ≤ snδ, (G10)
‖Wj(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)(UW ′j†U† −W †j )‖1
≤‖Wj(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)‖1‖(UW ′j†U† −W †j )‖
=‖(UW ′j†U† −W †j )‖ ≤ snδ. (G11)
Combining (G9), (G10), and (G11), we have
‖UΛ′(U†ρU)U† − Λ(ρ)‖1
≤‖UW ′jU†(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)UW ′j†U†
−Wj(ρ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗n)W †j ‖1
≤2snδ, (G12)
where the first inequality follows from the information
processing inequality with respect to the trace of the un-
trusted system. Hence, we obtain (G7).
Appendix H: Error in the initial state: Proof of
inequality (11)
In this section, we show a slightly stronger inequality
than inequality (11) of main text:
‖UσU† − |G〉〈G|‖21 ≤ 6nδ +
3α
m
(H1)
by assuming Inequalities (3)–(5) in Theorem 2.
Now, we have the relation
‖UσU† − |G〉〈G|‖21
(a)
≤1− Tr 〈G|UσU†|G〉 = Tr (I − |G〉〈G|)UσU†
(b)
≤Tr (I − P1)UσU† + Tr (I − P2)UσU†
+Tr (I − P3)UσU†, (H2)
where (a) follows from the relation between the trace
norm and the fidelity [37, (6.106)] and (b) follows from
the inequality I−|G〉〈G| ≤ (I−P1)+(I−P2)+(I−P3).
We can apply (G8) with s = 2 to Pi because Pi is a
POVM element of an adaptive measurement based on X
and Z. So, we have
|Tr (U(I − P ′i )U† − (I − Pi))UσU†|
=|Tr (UP ′iU† − Pi)UσU†|
≤‖UP ′iU† − Pi‖ ≤ 2nδ. (H3)
Thus, Inequality (9) in Theorem 2 implies
Tr (I − Pi)UσU†
=Tr ((I − Pi)− U(I − P ′i )U†)UσU†
+Tr (I − P ′i )σ ≤ 2nδ +
α
m
. (H4)
The combination of (H2) and (H4) yields (H1).
Appendix I: Interactive proof system
Although not explicitly stated in the main part, our
protocol is an instance of an interactive proof system
[38, 39] for any language in BQP with a quantum prover
(Bob) and a nearly-classical verifier (Alice) equipped
with a random number generator. More formally, for
every language L ∈ BQP and input x there exists
a poly(|x|)-time verifier V interacting with a poly(|x|)
number of quantum provers such that if x ∈ L, there
exists a set of honest provers for which V accepts with
probability at least c = 2/3 (completeness). If x /∈ L,
then for any set of provers, V accepts with probability at
most pincorrect ≤ s = 1/3 (soundness), where pincorrect
is given by Eq. (12) of the main part.
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Appendix J: Self testing with multi-colorable graph
Now, we give a protocol for k-colorable graph state as
follows. For each color i = 1, . . . , k, we divide the set Si
of sites with color i into subsets Si,1, . . . , Si,li such that
there is no common neighborhood with non-i color for
each subset Si,j . Then, as a generalization of B-protocol,
we propose the i-protocol with the subset Si,j as follows.
(3-1): We prepare 8m states |G′〉.
(3-2): We measure Z ′ on all sites of Si\Si,j for all copies.
Then, we apply Z ′ operators on the remaining sites
to correct applied Z ′ operators depending on the
outcomes.
(3-3): For all a ∈ Si,j , we choose a site ba ∈ Na. Then,
we measure Z ′ on all sites of (∪t6=iSt) \ {ba}a∈Si,j
for all copies. Then, we apply Z ′ operators on the
remaining sites to correct applied Z ′ operators de-
pending on the outcomes.
(3-4): Due to the above steps, the resultant state should
be ⊗a∈Si,j |Φ′〉aba . Then, we apply the self-testing
procedure to all of {|Φ′〉aba}a∈Si,j .
The above protocol verifies the measurement device on
sites with i-th color. Then, applying this generalization
to all colors in the protocol, we can extend the first part.
To realize the second part, for each color i, we measure
non-i color sites with Z basis and check whether the out-
come of measurement X on the sites with color i is the
same as the predicted one. Then, we denote the projec-
tion corresponding to the passing event for this test by
Pi. Hence, we have
∏k
i=1 Pi = |G〉〈G| because only the
state |G〉 can pass all of these tests. Thus, applying this
test for all colors, we can test whether the state is the
desired graph state.
Then, choosing c3 to be k+8(
∑k
i=1 li), we propose our
self-testing protocol as follows,
(4-1): We prepare c3m+ 1 n-qubit states |G′〉.
(4-2): We randomly divide the c3m+1 copies into c3 +1
groups. The first c3 groups are composed of m
copies and the final group is composed of a single
copy.
(4-3): For the first k groups, we apply the following test.
For the i-th group, we measure Z ′ on the sites with
non-i color and X ′ on the sites with i-th color, and
check that the outcome of X ′ measurements is the
same as predicted from the outcomes of Z ′ mea-
surements.
(4-4): We run the i-protocol with Si,j for the k + 8(j −
1 +
∑i−1
i′=1 li′) + 1-th -k+ 8(j+
∑i−1
i′=1 li′)-th groups.
Then, we check 8 conditions in Step (2-5). We re-
peat this protocol for j = 1, . . . , li and i = 1, . . . , k.
When we employ the above protocol for k-colorable
case, the difference from the 3-colorable case is only the
number of samples. we have the same analysis for the
certification of computation result as the 3-colorable case.
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